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 1 
British Idealism 
Robert Stern 
 
In his recent magnum opus on the history of ethics, Terence Irwin gives the thought 
of the British Idealists, and particularly T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley, an unusually 
prominent role, as in many ways representing the high-point of moral philosophy in 
modern times. This is surprising, because most contemporary ethicists have probably 
never read their work, and would certainly hesitate to rank them above figures such as 
J. S. Mill, Henry Sidgwick, G. E. Moore and John Rawls, for example. However, 
ZKHQRQH UHDOL]HVZKHUH ,UZLQ¶VRZQFRQFHUQV OLH WKHQ WKLV LV OHVV VXUSULVLQJ )RU
Irwin is interested in the Aristotelian tradition within ethics, and its subsequent 
development, and thus how it has fared in relation to its critics, of which perhaps none 
is more prominent than Kant. Irwin believes, however, that much of this Kantian 
FULWLTXHLVPLVSODFHGDQGWKDWLQIDFWZKHQSURSHUO\GHYHORSHG.DQW¶VRZQWKLQNLQJ
turns out to need some appeal to Aristotelian insights, and thus that these apparently 
divergent traditions can be brought together, to the mutual benefit of each.1  
 +RZHYHU LI ,UZLQ¶V DSSURDFK GRHV WKH %ULWLVK ,GHDOLVWV WKH JUHDW IDYRXU RI
rescuing them from historical obscurity, it also immediately highlights what may be 
seen as problematic with their views: namely, that by attempting to combine 
Aristotelianism with Kantianism, they end up with an incoherent position that can 
only be dialectically unstable. Clearly, then, even if Irwin is right about what the 
British Idealists were trying to achieve, their impact can only prove to be lasting if 
they managed to succeed, and so create some sort of genuine synthesis rather than an 
inconsistent ethical system. 
 ,QWKLVFKDSWHUWKHUHIRUH,ZDQWWRXVH,UZLQ¶VVXJJHVWLRQDV the background 
to my account of the British Idealists, and to explore it further. I will claim that 
,UZLQ¶VZD\RIORFDWLQJWKHPZLWKLQWKHKLVWRU\RIHWKLFVLVLQGHHGKHOSIXOZKLOHDOVR
allowing us to bring out the difficulties in their position. Broadly speaking, I will 
DUJXHWKLVSRVLWLRQFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDIRUPRIµSRVW-.DQWLDQSHUIHFWLRQLVP¶2 that 
is, an ethics that is based on claims about how the moral life relates to human self-
realization, but while at the same time taking into account Kant¶VZHOO-known critique 
                                                          
1
 Cf. Irwin 2007: 5. The main discussion of Green and Bradley can be found in Irwin 
2009, in chapters 85 and 84 respectively. 
2
 I borrow this helpful phrase from Douglas Moggach: see e.g. Moggach 2011. 
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of any such view. After Kant, it may have appeared that such perfectionism was a 
µGHDG GXFN¶ EXW WKH LQWHUHVW RI *UHHQ DQG %UDGOH\ KRZHYHU LV WKDW WKH\ VHOI-
consciously attempt to show how this response was premature, while nonetheless 
taking such Kantian concerns seriously. The result, therefore, is a new take on this 
traditional ethical position, which in their hands is reshaped in unexpected ways. 
 I will begin by sketching the Kantian critique of perfectionism, before 
examining how Green and Bradley3 responded in different ways to that critique, in 
their attempts to revive what they took to be valuable in the approach that Kant had 
attempted to surpass. 
 
1. The Kantian critique of perfectionism 
The core ideas behind the approach that Kant took himself to be attacking are 
KHOSIXOO\FDSWXUHGLQ,UZLQ¶VVXPPDU\RI$ULVWRWOH¶VSRVLWLRQ 
 
[Aristotle] defends an account of the human good as happiness (eudaimonia), 
consisting in the fulfilment of human nature, expressed in the various human 
virtues. His position is teleological, in so far as it seeks the best guide for 
action in an ultimate end, eudaimonist, in so far as it identifies the ultimate 
end with happiness, and naturalist, in so far as it identifies virtue and 
happiness in a life that fulfils the nature and capacities of rational human 
nature.4 
 
While a position of this sort can be called eudaimonist, it can also be called 
perfectionist, because it takes such happiness to consist in the development of our 
distinctive capacities, rather than simply pleasure or desire-satisfaction. On the other 
hand, it may be distinguished from a more narrow form of perfectionism, which takes 
this development to be a good in itself, rather than as an aspect of the well-being of 
the individual. 
 Within the ethical thinking of his time, and when combined with certain 
WKHRORJLFDO WKHPHV FRQFHUQLQJ WKH SXUSRVHV RI *RG¶V FUHDWLRQ WKLV RXWORRN PD\ EH
                                                          
3
 In what follows, I will be focusing just on Green and Bradley, as these are by 
common consent the most significant ethicists in the British Idealist tradition. For 
discussion of other figures such as Edward Caird and Henry Jones, see Mander 2011. 
4
 Irwin 2007: 4. 
 3 
WDNHQ WR EH WKH GRPLQDQW YLHZSRLQW RI .DQW¶V FRQWHPSRUDULHV ZKHUH LWV PRVW
influential spokesperson was Christian Wolff. Thus, when Kant came to propose that 
the much sought-DIWHU µVXSUHPH SULQFLSOH RI PRUDOLW\¶ VKRXOG EH µWR QHYHU SURFHHG
except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim could become universal 
law¶5 one prominent alternative candidate amongst others that he sought to discredit 
ZDVWKHSHUIHFWLRQLVWSULQFLSOHµ6HHNSHUIHFWLRQDVPXFKDV\RXFDQ¶&RQVHTXHQWO\
when Kant sets out to distinguish his account of the supreme principle of morality 
from all those so far put forward, perfectionism is one of the options he rejects, for 
several related reasons: it is heteronomous; it collapses morality into a system of 
merely hypothetical imperatives; it makes morality empirical rather than a priori; it 
puts the good prior to the right; and it is unable to provide any contentful guidance on 
how we should act. Let us briefly consider each of these points in turn. 
 According to Kant, all prior attempts to arrive at a supreme principle of 
morality, including those made by the perfectionist, are misguided because they are 
based on a heteronomous conception of the will: namely, that the ends of the will are 
set by desire or inclination, to which reason then determines the means. The 
FRQVHTXHQFHKRZHYHULVWKDWµWKHZLOOGRHVQRWJLYHLWVHOIWKHODZbut the object by 
LWVUHODWLRQWRWKHZLOOJLYHVWKHODZWRLW¶6 and thus autonomy is undermined as reason 
becomes the slave of the passions. Thus, in the case of perfectionism, Kant argues that 
the link between perfection and well-being is foundational, where it is then the desire 
for the latter that is seen to motivate agents in following the principle of perfecting 
themselves, given the satisfactions that acting in accordance with it will bring. The 
result, however, is to make practical reason subservient to desire, in a heteronomous 
manner. Moreover, as a consequence of this connection between perfectionism and 
well-being, Kant argues, the perfectionist can only treat the imperatives of morality as 
hypothetical and not categorical: that is, they hold only because we have a sufficiently 
strong inclination towards the end of happiness to which perfecting ourselves and our 
capacities is the means. Furthermore, the position is a consequentialist and hence 
empirical one, for the rightness of an act is determined by how far it increases 
perfection, and this can be determined only on the basis of experience, whereas for 
Kant moral judgements should be possible a priori.7 
                                                          
5
 Kant 2012 4:402.  
6
 Kant 2012 4:441. 
7
 For helpful further discussion of some of these themes, see Guyer 2011. 
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 As well as these mistakes, Kant also accuses perfectionism of making a 
fundamental but tempting methodological error in conducting its inquiry into the 
supreme principle of morality: namely, of starting from a conception of what is good, 
and from that trying to arrive at an account of the moral law, whereas for Kant we 
must proceed the other way round if we are not to be led into error. For, Kant argues, 
if we try to conceive of the good unconstrained by some prior conception of the moral 
law, we will inevitably think of the good in terms of happiness and pleasure, and thus 
end up with the sort of heteronomous and hypothetical view of morality that one finds 
in perfectionism, amongst other moral systems.8 Kant allows that perhaps the 
SHUIHFWLRQLVWPLJKWUHVSRQGWRDZRUU\RIWKLVVRUWE\DFFHSWLQJ.DQW¶VSRLQWDQGVR
holding that attributes are not perfections because they make us happy, but because 
they make us morally good; but then, Kant argues, the perfectionist principle is an 
empty one, because we now need to know what it is to be morally good before we can 
assess which attributes to cultivate and which capacities to realize, so the position is 
hopelessly circular, and cannot help us decide how to act.9 
 We have therefore seen the problems that Kant raised for the perfectionist 
tradition, which may seem to leave it fatally damaged. NonethelessRIFRXUVH.DQW¶V
own position is far from unproblematic, so that once this became apparent, it was 
perhaps inevitable that the attempt would be made to see if in fact these two 
approaches can be brought together somehow to the mutual advantage of both, rather 
than beings set at odds with one another. As Irwin has argued, the British Idealists 
may be seen as adopting this strategy, and thus as developing perfectionism in a post-
.DQWLDQ IRUP ZKLFK WDNHV DVSHFWV RI .DQW¶V FULWLTXH RQ ERDUG DQG PRGLILHV WKe 
position accordingly, thereby giving it a new lease of life. 
 
2. Two forms of perfectionism: capacity-based and holistic 
Before we turn to the discussion of the work of Green and Bradley, however, it is 
useful to draw out a distinction within the perfectionist approach which (I will claim) 
underlies an important difference in their respective approaches, and thus in the way 
that each tries to deal with the Kantian challenge. This is the distinction between a 
perfectionism which sees the ideal self as one that has fully developed its capacities or 
                                                          
8
 Kant 1996 5:58; cf. also 5:64-5. 
9
 &I.DQWµ>3HUIHFWLRQLVP@KDVDQXQDYRLGDEOHSURSHQVLW\WRUHYROYH
DURXQGLQDFLUFOHDQGFRYHUWO\WRSUHVXSSRVHWKHPRUDOLW\LWLVVXSSRVHGWRH[SODLQ¶ 
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capabilities, and a perfectionism which sees the ideal self as a unified or harmonious 
whole. 
 This difference may be traced back to the origins of this tradition in Plato and 
in Aristotle. Thus, for Plato, goodness is taken to be a proper balance or order among 
parts in a holistic manner,10 whilst for Aristotle the focus is more on how far certain 
potentialities or capacities are realized and successfully developed. In general, it 
PLJKWEHDUJXHG$ULVWRWOH¶VDSSURDFK is the predominant one, and can be found for 
example in Aquinas when he contrasts the imperfection of potentiality with the 
perfection of actuality.11 +RZHYHU 3ODWR¶V RXWORRN DOVR UHPDLQV HPEHGGHG LQ WKH
perfectionist tradition. Thus, for example, while his position also contains Aristotelian 
HOHPHQWV :ROII DUJXHV WKDW µ7KH KDUPRQ\ >Zusammenstimmung] of the manifold 
FRQVWLWXWHVWKHSHUIHFWLRQRIWKLQJV¶12 VRWKDWWKHSHUIHFWLRQRIWKHZLOOFRQVLVWVLQµWKH
harmony of all and every volition with one another, none running contrary to the 
UHVW¶13 
 Now of course, both forms of perfectionism can easily be put together, in the 
thought that in order to realize our capacities, we must do so in a harmonious manner, 
without each being at odds with the others; or, it could be argued that some capacities 
can only themselves be properly actualized in a unified and coherent way. This 
convergence between the two views explains why they are often run together and the 
difference is not usually highlighted or held to be significant. Nonetheless, they are 
still conceptually distinct; and, I will now suggest, when it comes to Green and 
Bradley, they do indeed come apart, under the pressure of finding an adequate 
SHUIHFWLRQLVWUHVSRQVHWR.DQW¶VFULWLTXH 
 
3. *UHHQ¶VFDSDFLW\-based perfectionism 
In his Prolegomena to Ethics, Green prefaces his theory of morality with an important 
discussion of the will in Book II. He starts by offering an account of action, where he 
argues that what guides the will it not some specific want or desire, but a conception 
                                                          
10
 &I.UDXWµ>7@KHJRRGQHVVRI)RUPVFRQVLVWVLQWKHIDFWWKDWWKH\SRVVHVV
a kind of harmony, balance, or proportion; and their superiority to all other things 
consists in the fact that the kind of order they possess gives them a higher degree of 
KDUPRQ\WKDQDQ\RWKHUW\SHRIREMHFW¶,QVXSSRUWRIWKLVUHDGLQJ.UDXWFLWHV
Philebus 23c-d and 64d-e. 
11
 Aquinas 1920: 1-2 question 3 article 2. 
12
 Wolff 1751: §152. Cf. Baumgarten 1779: §94.  
13
 Wolff 1751: §907. 
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RIWKHDJHQW¶VRZQJUHDWHVWJRRG± KHQFHKHFODLPVWKHDJHQWLQDFWLQJDLPVDWµVHOI-
VDWLVIDFWLRQ¶14 For Green, therefore, when it comes to making a choice, there is no 
selection between competing desires made by the will; rather, the choice is made in 
GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKLFK RI WKH GHVLUHV LI VDWLVILHG ZRXOG FRQVWLWXWH WKH DJHQW¶V JUHDWHVW
good, and on the basis of this decision the will then comes to act, with the other 
desires having been silenced.15 
Green recognizes, however, that this picture leaves an important question 
unanswered when it comes to ethics: namely, what is it that distinguishes a morally 
good will from a morally bad one? Of course, on some accounts, this difference is 
marked by a distinction between the good agent who has no concern for their own 
well-being, and a bad one who is so concerned: but Green cannot take this option, 
given his account of action outlined above where such self-concern is present in all 
agents ± VRZKHUHGRHVWKHGLIIHUHQFHOLH"*UHHQ¶VDQVZHULVWhat the difference comes 
from the different conceptions of self-satisfaction that agents can have, and thus in 
µWKH FKDUDFWHU RI WKDW LQ ZKLFK VHOI-satisfaction is sought, ranging from sensual 
pleasure to the fulfilment of a vocation conceived as given by *RG¶16 *UHHQ¶V
position depends, therefore, on making out some grounds on which to distinguish 
good and bad conceptions of self-satisfaction that might be held by different agents, 
where this explains the basis on which we might make a moral distinction between 
them.  
 For Green, then, the difference between the good and the bad person lies in 
their different conceptions of where and in what manner they can find self-
satisfaction, and what this consist in.17 But Green recognizes a difficulty: namely, that 
there is a circle here, as we seem to have to already know what moral goodness 
consists in before we can characterize an agent as moral and thus what the self-
satisfaction of such an agent will involve; and on the other hand, if we do already 
know what such PRUDOJRRGQHVVDPRXQWV WRZHZRXOGQ¶WKDYHWRFKDUDFWHUL]HLWDV
what brings satisfaction to the moral agent, but must be able to grasp it independently 
in a prior manner, or not at all.18 Faced with this difficulty, Green refers back to the 
metaphysical theorizing that he had developed in Book I of the Prolegomena, before 
                                                          
14
 Cf. Green 2003: §95. 
15
 Cf. §104 and §§145-6. 
16
 §154. 
17
 Cf. §171. 
18
 Cf. §172. 
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he turned to the will and ethics as such, which argued that the world is the realization 
of a self-developing eternal mind;19 and from this, he thinks we are entitled to infer 
that what leads to the fulfilling of our capacities and thus our self-satisfaction is also 
what is morally good, and vice versa.20  
We have seen, then, that Green holds that the good agent aims at the 
realization of his or her capacities, where he now argues that this µZLOO NHHSEHIRUH
him an object, which he presents to himself as absolutely desirable, but which is other 
WKDQDQ\SDUWLFXODUREMHFWRIGHVLUH¶21 In the case of such particular objects, he will 
take these to have value only in so far as they satisfy some desire of his; but in the 
case of his self-UHDOL]DWLRQµ>L@WZLOOEHDQLQWHUHVWDVLQDQREMHFWFRQFHLYHGWREHRI
unconditional value; one of which the value does not depend on any desire that the 
individual may at any time feel for it or for anything else, or on any pleasure that, 
HLWKHULQLWVSXUVXLWRULQLWVDWWDLQPHQWRUDVLWVUHVXOWKHPD\H[SHULHQFH¶22 In other 
words, Green claims that while the agent may see the value of everything else in 
terms of his wants and their attendant pleasures, he does not see the realization of his 
capacities in this way, as these constitute the end against which such wants and 
pleasures are themselves measured.23 
However, we still have the problem of specifying what this unconditional 
good of self-realization consists in, where if we say that it is what the good will is 
GLUHFWHG WRZDUGV ZH ZLOO MXVW EH µPRYLQJ LQ D FLUFOH¶ EHFDXVH ZH KDYH QR
independent conception of the good will, while the complete realization of human 
capacities has not yet been achieved.24 Nonetheless, Green thinks, we can turn to the 
history of ethics to provide us with an important clue, where the key here (he argues) 
KDVEHHQWKHFHQWUDOµPRUDOLGHDO¶RIWKHFRPPRQJRRGLQZKLFKLQGLYLGXDOVILQGWKHLU
good to be bound up with that of others. At an earlier stage, in Greek ethics, these 
µRWKHUV¶MXVWFRPSULVHGRQH¶VLPPHGLDWHFRPPXQLW\RUSROLVEXWLQ&KULVWLDQHWKLFV
this is widened to include all individuals. As a result of this conception of self-
realization, Green argues that the distinctioQEHWZHHQ µEHQHYROHQFH¶DQG µVHOI-ORYH¶
DQGWKXV6LGJZLFN¶VIDPRXVµGXDOLVPRISUDFWLFDOUHDVRQ¶FROODSVHVDQGLVVKRZQWR
                                                          
19
 Cf. §67. 
20
 Cf. §181. 
21
 §193. 
22
 §193. 
23
 Cf. §193. 
24
 Cf. §194. 
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EHDµILFWLRQ¶25 insofar as no clear distinction can be drawn between the good of the 
individual and that of the society of which he or she is part, as the former good 
GHSHQGVRQWKHODWWHU*UHHQWKHUHIRUHZULWHVWKDWµ>W@KHRSSRVLWLRQRIVHOIDQGRWKHUV
does not enter into the consideration of a well-EHLQJ VR FRQVWLWXWHG¶26 Thus, Green 
argues, the agent will come to treat others not merely as means, but also as ends, in so 
IDUDVKHZLOOEHµOLYLQJIRUDQREMHFWFRPPRQWRKLPVHOIDQGDOOUDWLRQDOEHLQJVDQG
FRQVLVWLQJ LQ WKH SHUIHFWLRQ RI WKH UDWLRQDO QDWXUH¶ QRW MXVW LQ KLPVHOI EXW DOVR LQ
others.27 
Finally, in Book IV, Green considers how far his account can help in 
providing us with guidance for conduct. Here he admits that superficially, at least, a 
theory like utilitarianism may appear to be in a better position, in seeming to give us a 
more concrete criterion of right action. On the other hand, he argues, in practice the 
calculation of consequences in utilitarian terms is in fact virtually impossible, while 
the very search for a simple solution to cases of moral perplexity is itself wrong-
headed. Thus, Green argues, while it may not be easy to use perfection to tell us how 
to act, it is perhaps no worse off than any other moral theory is or should be. 
 7DNHQDVZKROHWKHUHIRUHLWLVHDV\WRVHHZK\*UHHQ¶VVWXGHQW'*5LWFKLH
VKRXOG KDYH FKDUDFWHUL]HG KLV YLHZ DV KDYLQJ µFRUUHcted Kant by Aristotle and 
$ULVWRWOHE\.DQW¶28 IRUZKLOHUHWXUQLQJWRVRPHWKLQJOLNH$ULVWRWOH¶VHXGDLPRQLVP
WKLVDOVRWDNHVDµSRVW-.DQWLDQ¶IRUPDQGLVLPSRUWDQWO\VKDSHGE\.DQW¶VFULWLTXHRI
the perfectionist tradition. So, in response to the charge of heteronomy, Green argues 
that our conception of the good is not merely set for us by desires and their 
satisfaction in a subjectivist manner, but involves the use of reason to determine 
where our proper self-satisfaction lies.29 Thus, he argues, moral requirements can be 
based on the good of self-realization but still be categorical imperatives, as this 
goodness is independent of contingent inclinations and interests.30 Green also shows 
himself to be sensitive to Kantian concerns regarding the priority of the moral law 
over the good, where the claim is that we must use the former to determine the latter; 
                                                          
25
 §232. 
26
 &IDOVRµ+LVRZQSHUPDQHQWZHOO-being he thus necessarily presents 
for himself as a social well-EHLQJ¶ 
27
 Green 1911: §118. 
28
 Ritchie 1891: 139.  
29
 But cf. Skorupski 2006: 57-8. 
30
 Cf. Green 2003: §193. 
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Green responds to this concern by using the history of ethics as a guide to the nature 
of self-realization, and so does not first try to offer an account of the good that does 
not take the principles of morality into account. Moreover, Green tries to deal with 
.DQW¶VREMHFWLRQ WKDW WKHFULWHULRQRISHUIHFWLRQ LV FLUFXODURUPRUDOO\HPSW\ ± or at 
OHDVW LVQRPRUHVR WKDW.DQW¶VRZQFULWHULRQRIXQLYHUVDOL]ability, or the utilitarian 
criterion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. At the same time, Green 
PD\ FODLP WRKDYH µFRUUHFWHG.DQWE\ $ULVWRWOH¶ LQRIIHULQJD WKHRU\RI DFWLRQDQG
motivation that gives a more central and plausible role to the conative side of the self, 
DQG KHQFH VKRZV KRZ VRPH RI .DQW¶V QRWRULRXV GLFKRWRPLHV FDQ EH RYHUFRPH IRU
example between duty and inclination, reason and desire. Finally, the sense in which 
*UHHQ LV D µSRVW-.DQWLDQ SHUIHFWLRQLVW¶ PD\ EH XQGHUOLQHG E\ WKe way in which he 
connects self-realization not only with flourishing but also with freedom as a form of 
autonomy, in a way that gives a distinctively Kantian slant to his perfectionism. 
 $W WKH VDPH WLPH KRZHYHU *UHHQ¶V ZD\ RI WU\LQJ WR DFFRPPRGDWH .DQW¶V
concerns may seem to reveal the weakness of his capacity-based view of 
SHUIHFWLRQLVP)RUH[DPSOHKHLVUHTXLUHGWRDSSHDOWRDµGLYLQHSULQFLSOH¶WRMXVWLI\
his claim that we will find proper self-realization in a morally good end and vice 
versa, which then allows him to use the history of ethics as a guide to what human 
self-realization involves. This enables him to avoid the essentialist or biologistic 
claims of the Aristotelian regarding what our capacities consist in that then need to be 
exercised in order to attain flourishing; but he does so at the price of having to rely on 
KLV LGHDOLVW PHWDSK\VLFV 0RUHRYHU WKH .DQWLDQ PD\ REMHFW WR *UHHQ¶V DWWHPSW WR
show how, by starting off with a concern for our own self-realization, we will end up 
with a cRQFHUQIRUWKDWRIRWKHUVEDVHGRQKLVFODLPWKDWDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VJRRGUHTXLUHV
him or her to promote a common good, i.e. a good in which others also share. There 
DUHWZRZRUULHVKHUH)LUVWWKHEULGJH*UHHQWULHVWREXLOGIURPWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VJRRG
to the common good may seem shaky, for it seems plausible to argue (as Sidgwick 
does, for example)31 that my self-realization, conceived of as the development of my 
capacities, will not always mean that it is best served through contributing to the good 
of otheUV RU DW OHDVW *UHHQ¶V DFFRXQW RI ZKDW VHOI-realization involves seems too 
vague to assert this connection with any great confidence,32 where it could plausibly 
be argued that some aspects of my good requires not co-operation with others, but 
                                                          
31
 Cf. Sidgwick 1902: 47-8 and 64. 
32
 Ibid., pp. 55-6. 
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competition against them. Second, even if this connection could be assumed, the 
.DQWLDQPD\VWLOODUJXHWKDWZKLOHRQ*UHHQ¶VSLFWXUHWKHUHLVDFDWHJRULFDOLPSHUDWLYH
to realize in me a certain kind of character, and while that character may be one that 
takes an interest in the good of others as well as myself, nonetheless ultimately this 
interest is still not properly impartial, as my reason to have this attitude is that I will 
then have the right conception of my own good, in a way that is ultimately concerns 
the benefits it brings to me in terms of self-satisfaction, and so is egoistic and not 
properly ethical.33 In this way, Kant may think, his claims about morality as involving 
an impartial concern with the significance of others are still not properly 
accommodated ZLWKLQ *UHHQ¶V SHUIHFWLRQLVP DQG WKDW KLV DWWHPSWV WR UHYLYH
Aristotelianism in this post-Kantian form have failed. 
 :HZLOO QRZFRQVLGHU%UDGOH\¶V DSSURDFKZKLFK LQYROYHV D UDWKHUGLIIHUHQW
view of the perfectionist position, in a way that may allow us to see how some of 
these concerns might be addressed. 
 
4. %UDGOH\¶VKROLVWLFSHUIHFWLRQLVP 
,QWKHVHFRQGµHVVD\¶RUFKDSWHURIEthical Studies, Bradley appears to show himself 
to be sensitive to the some of the concerns that have been raised above regarding 
*UHHQ¶VSRVLWLRQDQGWRHFKR.DQWLDQZRUULHVRYHUWKHDWWHPSWWRRIIHUDSHUIHFWLRQLVW
DQVZHUWR WKHTXHVWLRQRIµZK\VKRXOG,EHPRUDO"¶)RU%UDGOH\REVHUYHVLQZD\V
that came to be associated with H. A. Pritchard some decades later),34 unless this is 
itself a moral question (in which case the answer is obvious), it will make being moral 
into the means to a non-moral end, as concerning the interests of the individual, where 
µWRWDNHYLUWXHDVDPHUHPHDQVWRDQXOWHULRUHQGLVLQGLUHFWDQWDJRQLVPWRWKe voice 
RIWKHPRUDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶.35 Bradley may thus seem to be more alert than Green to 
the dangers of approaching morality in a perfectionist spirit, and hoping to find in it a 
UHVSRQVHWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIµZK\EHPRUDO"¶ 
 However, despite this, Bradley still thinks that the question can be given some 
meaning that will not lead us astray: for instead of asking if some prior end gives us a 
sufficient reason or motive to be moral, we can still ask what the relation is between 
acting morally and achieving our ultimate end qua human being and thus our good, 
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even when we do not think of the former as the means to the latter, where the question 
WKHQ EHFRPHV µ,V PRUDOLW\ WKH VDPH DV WKH HQG IRU PDQ VR WKDW WKH WZR DUH
convertible; or is morality one side, or aspect, or element of some end which is larger 
than itself? Is it the whole end from all points of view, or is it one view of the 
ZKROH"¶36 Now, to answer this TXHVWLRQRIFRXUVH UHTXLUHVXV WRVSHFLI\ZKDW µWKH
HQGIRUPDQ¶LVZKLFK%UDGOH\VD\VLVself-realization. He admits at once, however, 
WKDWLWLVKDUGIRUKLPWRSURYHWKLVFODLPDVWRGRVRZRXOGUHTXLUHµVRPHWKLQJOLNHD
V\VWHP RI PHWDSK\VLFV¶37 which he cannot hope to provide here; nonetheless, he 
thinks it can be made plausible if we think about the nature of action, where again like 
Green he emphasizes that on a variety of different accounts, actions only occur if and 
ZKHQ ZH µIHHO RXUVHOYHV DVVHUWHG RU DIILUPHG LQ WKHP¶38 and so take ourselves to 
realize ourselves in so acting. 
 At this point, therefore, Bradley thinks he is entitled to ask about the relation 
between morality and self-realization;39 but now of course he needs to tell us 
something about self-realization and what this amount to. It is here that his holistic 
perfectionism begins to emerge, where he argues that what the individual is trying to 
UHDOL]HFDQQRWEHDµPHUHRQH¶RUDµPHUHPDQ\¶EXWUDWKHUDµRQHLQPDQ\RUDPDQ\
LQRQH¶± QDPHO\µWKHVHOIDVDZKROHZKLFKLVQRWPHUHO\WKHVXPRILWVSDUWVQRU\HW
some other parWLFXODUEHVLGHWKHP¶7KXV%UDGOH\DVNVUKHWRULFDOO\µPXVWZHQRWVD\
that to realize self is always to realize a whole, and that the question in morals is to 
ILQG WKH WUXH ZKROH UHDOL]LQJ ZKLFK ZLOO SUDFWLFDOO\ UHDOL]H WKH WUXH VHOI"¶40 This, 
then, gives the focus for the rest of Ethical Studies, as we can now ask, of various 
ethical systems, whether on their accounts morality as they conceive it would coincide 
with self-UHDOL]DWLRQ WDNHQ LQ WKLVZD\ DQG WKXVKRZ LWZRXOG UHODWH WR µWKHHQG IRU
PDQ¶ 
 OQ WKLV EDVLV WKHUHIRUH %UDGOH\ DUJXHV WKDW D PRUDOLW\ RI µSOHDVXUH IRU
SOHDVXUH¶V VDNH¶ RU RI µGXW\ IRU GXW\¶V VDNH¶ ZKLFK URXJKO\ FRUUHVSRQG WR
utilitarianism and Kantianism respectively) cannot be satisfactory, as in neither can 
the self realize itself as a whole, as each position takes a one-sided view of this 
totality: the former views the self as a collection of particular interests, while the latter 
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views it as a pure will operating at an abstractly universal level standing above all 
such differentiation.41 Moving in a dialectical manner, Bradley then introduces a third 
RSWLRQRI µP\VWDWLRQDQG LWVGXWLHV¶ WKDW VHHPV WR UHVROYH WKHRQH-sided opposition 
between these earlier alternatives, and thus arrive at a moral outlook that can do 
justice to the unity-in-difference of the self, by balancing the plurality of particularity 
with the oneness of universality. 
 What this requires, Bradley argues, is that morality comes from the ethical life 
of the community, in which there is room for both particularity and universality, as 
the individual carries out the specific and concrete social role that they occupy, while 
that role fits into a wider and more universal totality of which the individual is a 
part.42 Earlier in Ethical Studies, Bradley had adapted a sa\LQJRI*RHWKH¶VWRZULWH
µ<RXFDQQRWEHDZKROHunless \RXMRLQDZKROH¶43 where it is thus in the unity of 
WKH FRPPXQLW\ ZLWK LWV HWKLFV RI µP\ VWDWLRQ DQG LWV GXWLHV¶ WKDW WKH VHOI FDQ EH
realized in this holistic sense. 
 However, despite arguing with considerable rhetorical force for this position,44 
Bradley also recognizes its limitations, including the worry that the individual may 
live within an imperfect state and so find no self-realization in ethical life, or may find 
such self-realization elsewhere, outside the moral life of the community altogether, 
for example in scientific inquiry or aesthetic production. Thus, in his search for a 
view of morality that coincides more fully with self-realization, Bradley moves to 
ZKDW KH FDOOV µLGHDO PRUDOLW\¶, where the moral is seen as including more than the 
VRFLDOUHODWLRQVRIµP\VWDWLRQDQGLWVGXWLHV¶DQGVRDVLQYROYLQJERWKGHPDQGVWKDW
may be made on us beyond those required by any actual society, and also the kinds of 
duties to oneself that make the life of the artist or theorist moral in this broader 
sense.45 Once broadened in this way, Bradley observes, it may be tempting to answer 
his original question in the affirmative.46 
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 Bradley 1927: 142. 
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 The influence of the Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit is clearly very strong at this 
point in the text. 
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 Bradley 1927: 79. 
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However, despite this seemingly optimistic result of his inquiries so far, 
Bradley still raises a difficulty: for morality, he thinks, involves what ought to be, not 
what is, and this always incorporates a gap between our actual existence and our full 
and final self-realization, so that for morality to make sense at all, the two can never 
coincide completely.47 It is this tension, Bradley holds, that in thinking about self-
realization takes us beyond morality altogether, and into religion, where Ethical 
Studies closes. 
 %HIRUHLWGRHVVRKRZHYHU%UDGOH\LQWHUSRVHVDFKDSWHURQµ6Hlfishness and 
Self-6DFULILFH¶ LQ ZKLFK LQWHU DOLD KH FRQVLGHUV KRZ IDU D WKHRU\ OLNH KLV PLJKW EH
accused of doing away with morality and reducing it to self-interest, in so far as he 
KROGVWKDWµWKHUHLVVHOI-realization in all action; witness the feelinJRISOHDVXUH¶48 He 
argues, however, that while pleasure does indeed come from self-realization, this does 
not make pleasure the motive for the action, or our reason for it, and the same is true 
of self-realization itself; he therefore rejects the charge of selfishness that might be 
raised against his perfectionist ethics.49 
 :HFDQDJDLQVHHWKHUHIRUHKRZIDU%UDGOH\¶VIRUPRISHUIHFWLRQLVPDWWHPSWV
WRRIIHUDµSRVW-.DQWLDQ¶YDULDQWRQWKLVWUDGLWLRQE\DWWHPSWLQJWRUHVSRQGWRRUDYRLG
.DQW¶VFULWLFLVPV of this position in ethics. Bradley in a sense concedes a good deal of 
ground to those criticisms, for example by allowing that perfectionism cannot and 
should not provide an answer to the moral sceptic, or set itself up as offering guidance 
DVDµVXSUHPH SULQFLSOHRIPRUDOLW\¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQGKHDUJXHVWKDWWKHIRUPHUJRDO
is inappropriate, while we can still intelligibly ask questions regarding the relation 
between morality and self-realization, and whether in acting morally we do realize 
ourselves, even while allowing that we do not act morally in order to do so in an 
instrumental fashion; and as regards the latter, Bradley argues that this is also not the 
business of moral theory, and that Kant himself is no more successful than other 
moralists in pURYLGLQJXVZLWKVXFKDµVXSUHPHSULQFLSOH¶50 In this sense, his strategy 
LVPRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHGWKDQ*UHHQ¶VZKRLVJHQHUDOO\QRWVRVHOI-conscious about the 
limitations of his project, and the justifications for such limitations. 
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 Equally, perhaps, BradlH\¶V KROLVWLF SHUIHFWLRQLVP KHOSV KLP DYRLG WKH
difficulties that Green had in having to employ his metaphysics to show why the 
FDSDFLWLHV ZH KDYH FDQ EHVW EH UHDOL]HG LQ WKH PRUDO OLIH %UDGOH\¶V DQVZHU E\
contrast, depends on his account of the structure of the will and its possible 
harmony,51 UDWKHUWKDQDSSHDOLQJWRWKHµGLYLQHSULQFLSOH¶LQPDQWRHQVXUHWKDWVHOI-
realization and morality will coincide. While of course not without its problems, this 
would seem to give perfectionism a basis that is likeliest to be persuasive to the 
contemporary mind, and thus of the two idealist thinkers, to offer us the more 
powerful insight into a perfectionism that takes this post-Kantian form. At the very 
least, it should now perhaps be clear that as a result of the Kantian critique, 
perfectionism came to take two rather different forms in the hands of its idealist 
proponents, so what had formerly been inseparable aspects of this tradition ± the 
capacity view and the holistic view ± here come apart, with Green emphasizing one 
aspect, and Bradley the other. 
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